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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 3, Number 4 (March 5, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Erratic behavior again causes concern 
President Yel'tsin had long been anticipated to subject his government to bitter 
criticism and on 26 February, when a key government meeting postponed from 1 
December was finally convened, it appeared as though Yel'tsin was prepared to 
meet expectations. Starting off the meeting with an angry attack on the 
government's shortcomings and the country's continuing economic problems, 
Yel'tsin vowed to find the "culprits" responsible for the government's failure. The 
president further suggested that two or three officials would be dismissed by the 
end of the meeting. 
 
Yel'tsin must have changed his mind however, because he abruptly left the 
meeting following an hour-long address by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. 
Chernomyrdin's address was itself highly critical of the government's 
performance. Yel'tsin's departure was unexpected enough to spark speculation 
as to the state of his health -- his movements were halting, he coughed 
frequently, but spoke coherently without notes. A Kremlin spokesman claimed 
that, despite the impulsive appearance of the president's exit, it had been 
planned; in fact, the president went directly to the Kremlin to record his weekly 
radio address. 
 
In any event, the long-awaited personnel changes have begun. Please see the 
"Government" section for further information. 
 
APPARAT 
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The Yumashev shuffle 
Each new chief of the President's Staff gets his opportunity to restructure the 
Kremlin apparat, and Valentin Yumashev provides no exception. Despite so 
many attempts to reshuffle the deck however, eventually a familiar configuration 
or two reappears in the new schematic. So it is with the Main Cossack 
Department, once independent then subordinated to the Presidential Staff: It is 
now slated, according to the latest presidential decree, to be extracted from the 
staff, constituted as a Federal Organ independent of all but presidential 
oversight. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-048) 
 
There are innovations in the Yumashev plan however. Several staff commissions 
and departments are amalgamated into more broadly defined administrations. In 
this regard, folding the president's Archive, Clerical Work Department, Computer 
Database Department, Software and Technical Support departments, among 
others, into a Presidential Information and Documentation Support Administration 
would seem to be a sensible, and perhaps even efficient, move. 
 
Most notable among the changes envisaged by Yumashev is an enumerated 
maximum limit on personnel per department and overall. The President's Staff, 
as set forth in this decree, will comprise a maximum of 1,945 employees, which 
represents a reduction of 100 staffers. The personnel cuts will come from the 
various subdivisions of the staff, including 8 from the Security Council Apparatus 
(leaving a total of 45); 12 from the Defense Council apparatus (leaving a total of 
88); and 8 from the State Military Inspectorate (leaving a total of 168). But wait. 
As is often the case, recent developments may have already out paced this 
reform. See "Security Council" below. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Rybkin transferred, Kokoshin steps in 
In connection with changes to the composition of the government, Ivan Rybkin 
has been replaced as secretary of the Security Council. (RIA-Novosti, 2 Mar 98) 
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Andrei Kokoshin, formerly chair of the RF Defense Council and chief of the State 
Military Inspectorate, will assume leadership of the Security Council from Rybkin. 
(RIA-Novosti, 3 Mar 98) In line with Kokoshin's move to the Security Council, the 
Defense Council and State Military Inspectorate are to be abolished, with their 
mandates and staffs to be aligned with and absorbed into the Security Council 
apparatus. 
 
The personnel and structural changes have generated policy ramifications as 
well. Chechen policy will no longer be formulated by the Security Council but will 
move with Rybkin to become part of the government's competence. Andrei 
Kokoshin, in addition to supervising the synthesis of Security and Defense 
Councils, has been directed by President Yel'tsin to work with Chernomyrdin to 
produce and submit within one month a new plan outlining military development 
and reform. (RIA-Novosti, 3 Mar 98) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Have the 'culprits' been identified? 
The dismissals promised by President Yel'tsin at the government's 26 February 
meeting were announced over the weekend. Valeri Serov, deputy prime minister 
in charge of CIS affairs, who was harshly criticized by PM Chernomyrdin during 
the meeting, was fired on Saturday and replaced by Ivan Rybkin. Rybkin will also 
oversee CIS Affairs, but, it was hastily noted, his role in negotiating Chechen 
relations does not signal an elevation of Chechnya's status to the level of a 
Commonwealth partner. (RIA-Novosti, 3 Mar 98) 
 
Also released from government service was the transportation minister Nikolai 
Tsakh, and the education minister, Vladimir Kinelyov. Tsakh is replaced by 
Sergei Frank and Kinelyov will be succeeded by his first deputy, Aleksandr 
Tikhonov. (RIA-Novosti, 2 Mar 98) While it seems unlikely that Tsakh and 
Kinelyov really represent the "culprits" Yel'tsin intended to identify and hold 
accountable for Russia's economic difficulties, they do have an interesting 
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element in common in their employment histories: They both became ministers in 
the government in January 1996. January 1996 may best be remembered as the 
month most remaining "reformers" left or were dismissed from government 
service in the wake of the December 1995 Duma elections, in which the 
"reform/centrist" parties fared woefully against a resurgent Communist Party led 
by Gennadi Zyuganov. January 1996 also marks the only time in his long service 
that Anatoli Chubais was dismissed from the government. 
 
Lest any officials sense relief in this round of dismissals, both government 
spokesman Shabdurasulov and presidential spokesman Yastrzhemsbky have 
stated that more personnel changes may be in the offing. (RIA-Novosti, 3 Mar 
98) 
 
Viktor Mikhailov leaves MinAtom 
In another unexpected announcement, the powerful Minister of Atomic Energy is 
departing his post. According to the president, Viktor Mikhailov is being 
transferred to the research sector. (RIA-Novosti, 2 Mar 98) According to the 
ministry staff, Mikhailov had been "planning retirement," and the decree on his 
dismissal was initiated by the minister himself. (ITAR-TASS, 2 Mar 98; NEXIS) In 
either event, Mikhailov's dismissal appeared to take many by surprise. 
 
There has been speculation that Mikhailov's departure is connected with recent 
(and not-so-recent) allegations of technology transfers to Iran and Iraq. Some 
have even suggested that Mikhailov was sacrificed as a salve to the Americans 
in the lead-up to next week's Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting. It would 
be an unusual and indeed heartening development, if true. 
 
As for Mikhailov himself, his remarks suggest bitter resignation: "It is impossible 
to work, and especially in the atomic sector, when people don't trust you." 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 March 98; NEXIS) 
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Yevgeni Adamov, the director and chief designer of the Research Institute of 
Nucleonics, has been selected to replace Mikhailov at MinAtom. Adamov was 
apparently recommended for the post by Mikhailov. (ITAR-TASS, 4 Mar 98; 
NEXIS) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough 
 
Hungarian visit to build trust but... 
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov's talks with the Hungarian prime minister 
confirmed their countries' willingness to boost bilateral cooperation. The talks 
revealed disagreements on the issue of Hungary's accession to NATO, but at the 
same time Primakov and Horn expressed the hope that these disagreements will 
not impede mutual efforts to promote trust and dialogue between Russia and 
Hungary. He admitted that "Hungary's orientation to Euro-Atlantic structures is a 
fait accompli," but Moscow is still worried by the possibility of NATO's military 
infrastructure moving to Russian borders. (ITAR-TASS, 1732 GMT, 18 Feb 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-049) 
 
Although Primakov asked the journalists not to interpret his visit to Hungary, 
which is seeking NATO membership, as a "tour of the countries invited to the 
North Atlantic Alliance," he used the occasion to reaffirm Moscow's opposition to 
future NATO expansion. Primakov said that Russia continues to be strongly 
opposed to NATO expansion to the east and considers the admission of any of 
the ex-Soviet republics, including the Baltic states, to the alliance as "absolutely 
inadmissible." He also added that one of the main tasks now is to oppose the 
creation of new deep dividing lines in Europe. (ITAR-TASS, 2037 GMT, 18 Feb 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-049) 
 
Development of bilateral relations deemed 'priority' 
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Primakov's official visit to Greece from 15-17 February marked a new stage in 
Russian-Greek relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesmen Valeri 
Nesterushkin stressed. "A personal message from Russian President Boris 
Yel'tsin was conveyed to the Greek head of state," Nesterushkin said. "The 
conversations held in Athens confirmed that there is national consensus in 
Greece with regard to the development of friendly relations and comprehensive 
cooperation with Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 2221 GMT, 19 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
050) 
 
While Primakov was in Greece, an intergovernmental Russo-Cuban commission 
for trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation opened its session 
in Havana. Among the most important projects discussed in the framework of the 
commission was the construction of a nuclear power plant in Juragua. The first 
phase of the once "frozen" plant will soon be put into operation. The participants 
in the session are representatives of the state structures of the two countries and 
Russian businessmen seriously interested in long-term partnership with Cuba. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1018 GMT, 20 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-051) 
 
Back in Moscow, attention was focused on Mideast policy. "Russia regards the 
development of relations with friendly Syria as a priority of its Middle East policy," 
Yel'tsin said in a message to his Syrian counterpart Hafiz al-Asad. He "confirmed 
Russia's intention to cooperate with Syria as a key player in the Middle East 
settlement," a Russian foreign ministry spokesman said in a briefing in Moscow 
on 22 February. The two sides have signed a memorandum of understanding 
between the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and the Syrian Atomic Energy 
Commission. (Interfax, 1256 GMT, 24 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-055) 
 
The following day, Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamal Kharrazi, arrived in 
Moscow. Diplomatic sources said that talks were planned with Primakov and 
other members of the Russian government on 24-26 February. The Russian 
diplomat noted that political dialogue between Moscow and Tehran is developing 
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most successfully. "Relations with Iran are a priority for Russia in the region," a 
Russian foreign ministry spokesman stated on the eve of the visit (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 2154 GMT, 23 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-054) Kharrazi also planned 
to discuss working out a new legal status for the Caspian Sea. (Interfax, 1323 
GMT, 16 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-047) 
 
Duma head in Israel 
A Russian State Duma delegation, headed by Chairman Gennadi Seleznev, 
began a two-day visit to Israel on 22 February. This is the first experience of 
cooperation between Russia and Israel in the framework of interparliamentary 
relations, implemented on the Knesset's initiative. During the visit the Russian 
parliamentarians planned to meet the leadership of the Palestinian National 
Authority in Gaza to discuss Russia's possible participation in resolving the 
regional conflict. Also Seleznev planned to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu 
during the visit. (Radio Rossii Network, 1100 GMT, 22 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
053) 
 
Russian involvement in Iraq situation denied, appreciated 
General Yuri Kobaladze denied allegations of Russian surveillance of Iraq 
weapons inspectors described in an article in the British newspaper, The Times. 
"This is complete rubbish," the general stressed. "Any sensible person would 
quite easily find a total lack of logic and common sense in the newspaper article." 
In the general's opinion, the absurdity of the situation described in the newspaper 
is obvious and insulting. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1135 GMT, 13 Feb 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-044) 
 
While Russian eyes were, evidently, focused on the Persian Gulf, this reportedly 
was due to the possible effects conflict would have on Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, 
first deputy speaker of the State Duma, stated his certainty that American attacks 
on Iraq will prevent Russia from ratifying the START II Treaty. He also 
commented on two other obstacles to ratification. Ryzhkov said that "in spite of 
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all the statements by the Americans that they will not press ahead" with the 
admission of new members to the alliance, "their actual foreign policy contradicts 
this." He cited the charter signed recently with the Baltic states, and recent US 
promises to Bulgaria to facilitate its admission to NATO. "The third reason is the 
prospect of a START III Treaty. Russia is making ratification of START II 
conditional on the drawing up of specific parameters for START III," Ryzhkov 
said. (ITAR-TASS, 19 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-050) 
 
Russian intervention did earn gratitude from at least one quarter. Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein on 23 February thanked Yel'tsin and Primakov for their 
"invaluable role" in the settlement of the Iraqi crisis. Hussein expressed gratitude 
for the contribution made by Yel'tsin and Primakov during his meeting with 
Russian special envoy Viktor Posuvalyuk. The president also thanked 
Posuvalyuk for being constantly in Baghdad during the crisis which, the INA 
news agency said, was caused by the United States. (ITAR-TASS, 1920 GMT, 
23 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-054) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Agrarian Party opposes proposal to free land sale 
The left-wing Agrarian Party announced its continued opposition to a Kremlin 
initiative to allow the free sale and ownership of farmland. Party chairman Mikhail 
Lapshin was responding to a recent statement made by Yel'tsin that the Kremlin 
would try to persuade the "milder opposition" to accept the proposed lifting of 
restrictions on the sale of land. 
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Lapshin claims that if the sale of farmland were to be allowed, a "revolutionary 
upheaval" in the countryside would result. According to Lapshin, a better solution 
would be to support the farmers -- and the present system. 
 
Clearly the sale of farmland could be organized in such a way as to benefit small- 
or medium-sized farmholders. This issue is not whether land should or should not 
be sold; the issue is how Russia wishes to distribute land ownership. The 
Agrarian Party is quite simply not the party of the individual farmer -- at least at 
the national level -- it is the party of the agricultural collective and of those 
administrators who benefit from the status quo. It is unfortunate that the interests 
of the simple farmer are not represented anywhere (Interfax, 1156 GMT, 2 Feb 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-033). 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma issues statement on US-Baltic partnership charter 
The statement admits that while the signatories are within their right to sign such 
agreements, due to the realities of history and the need for European stability, 
Russia remains interested in the relations between one of the world's leading 
powers and countries bordering it. 
 
The deputies noted the contradictory nature of the charter, which wishes no 
dividing lines in Europe, while speaking of a further expansion of NATO. The 
deputies were also annoyed by the timing of the agreement, which came soon 
after the Baltic states essentially rejected Russia's security guarantees. The 
statement is also critical of the Baltic-US Charter's concern for human rights, 
claiming that the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states are continuously 
being violated. 
 
The exaggerated importance that Russia places on the internal affairs of the 
Baltic states may come primarily from the states' former status as members of 
the Soviet Union. But it is also clear that this is perhaps the last area of Europe 
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where Russia believes it retains a degree of influence. However, judging from the 
Baltic states' independent actions of late, such influence must be considered to 
be marginal (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 3 Feb 98, p. 5; FBIS-SOV-98-034) 
 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
Lebed to run for governor of Russia's Siberian region 
A collection of signatures put the leader of the Popular Republican Party, 
Aleksandr Lebed, on the ballot as a gubernatorial candidate in the Siberian 
territory of Krasnoyarsk. The elections are scheduled for 26 April. 
 
Lebed is the former secretary of the Russian Security Council. Winning the 
governorship would provide him with a platform from which to launch the widely 
rumored candidacy for president. In addition to the title of governor, Lebed would 
also become a member of the Federation Council in Moscow, creating, 
presumably, a thorn in Boris Yel'tsin's side. As for the inhabitants of Krasnoyarsk, 
they must decide if they are willing to accept someone who will most likely be an 
absentee governor (Interfax, 1602 GMT, 9 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-040) 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Commander discusses Strategic Rocket Forces 
The commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Colonel General 
Vladimir Yakovlev, held a Moscow press conference recently and stated the 
combat capability of his troops remains high. Given the growing obsolescence of 
his present force and the limited funds for new systems, Yakovlev stressed that 
there was "no alternative to ratification of START II." (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 20 Feb 98) 
 
In a late January interview, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev announced that 
comprehensive testing of the Topol-M missile would be complete and that the 
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facilities of the Topol-M-equipped 104th missile regiment would be operational. 
(Flag rodiny, 24 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-043) 
 
Swedish foreign minister visits Baltic Fleet 
Mrs. Hjelm-Wallen visited the commander of the Baltic Fleet to follow up on 
President Yel'tsin's announcement concerning the reduction of Russian forces by 
40 percent in the Baltic region. Yel'tsin had made the announcement during a 
visit to Sweden in December. She said Sweden planned to reduce its own forces 
by 10 percent in the next five years. Although the Baltic Fleet commander did not 
discuss concrete force reduction steps that would be taken, the Swedish foreign 
minister nonetheless said she was confident Yel'tsin was serious about making 
substantial force reductions. (Strazh baltiki, 5 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-049) 
 
Another officer arrested in Kholodov case 
Vladimir Morozov, a major in the Airborne Troops Special-Purpose Regiment, 
was arrested on 19 February for involvement in the 1994 murder of journalist 
Dmitri Kholodov. Colonel Vladimir Kravchuk, chief of intelligence for the airborne 
troops, had been previously arrested in the case. Investigators also questioned 
former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev about the murder. (NTV, 20 Feb 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-051; Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13-20 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-047) 
 
Military told to pay electric bills 
The economics ministry has put the military on notice to pay its electric bills. 
Economics Minister Yakov Urinson said the government would place limits on the 
amount of energy the defense ministry could receive this year. Last year he said 
the defense ministry consumed over 10 trillion rubles of electricity, but was only 
budgeted for R2 trillion and spent only R1.5 trillion. (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 16 Feb 98) 
 
Ukraine to keep last Slava class cruiser 
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Ukraine announced it would complete the fourth and last Slava class cruiser. 
Laid down in 1985 and launched in 1990, the 12,500-ton cruiser was to be 
named the Admiral Lobov. Work stopped on the ship with the demise of the 
Soviet Union. A sister ship, Moskva, is being completed for the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet with financing provided by the city of Moscow. (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 23 Feb 98) 
 
In other Russian Navy news, the Frunze Naval Academy in St. Petersburg will be 
getting its first woman cadet. She will be the only woman in a school of 1500 
students. The defense ministry approved her request and Lyudmila Yolshina will 
become the first female naval cadet in Russian history. No other Russian naval 
school admits women. (St. Petersburg Times Weekly internet edition, 23 Feb 98) 
 
Defense ministry goes on-line 
The Russian defense ministry press office announced on 24 February that the 
ministry had opened an internet web page. Documents relating to military reform 
as well as military newspapers and journals will be available on the site. (ITAR-
TASS, 24 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-055) The article did not list the web page 
address. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
CIS defense ministers approve plan for future cooperation 
At their recent Minsk meeting, the CIS defense ministers approved a draft plan 
for military cooperation through the year 2001. According to a press release from 
the CIS Staff for Coordination of Military Cooperation, the plan covers "all areas 
of military cooperation," but highlights the further development of the joint air 
defense system. The council also approved budgets for several joint military 
programs and reappointed Russian General Viktor Prudnikov as chief of staff of 
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the headquarters for coordinating CIS military efforts and the chief of the CIS 
anti-aircraft (air defense) system. (Interfax, 30 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-030 and 
FBIS-UMA-98-030) 
 
After the meeting, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev proudly announced 
that the CIS is heading towards a "collective defense space." He then revealed 
his intentions by making reference to the recently signed Moscow-Minsk defense 
pact and announcing that "forming a single defense space in the framework of 
the Russian- Belarusian Union" will be discussed in the future (Interfax, 30 Jan 
98; FBIS-UMA-98-030). Provisions of the Russian-Belarusian pact include: a joint 
defense policy, the organization of joint armed defense, and the unification of the 
countries' defense legislation. (Belapan, 16 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-047) 
 
General Prudnikov had some comments on the future of Russian and CIS 
peacekeeping efforts. Prudnikov linked the creation of joint peacekeeping forces 
to the formation of national armed forces. Commenting that not all national forces 
are completely developed, he said that once they were, the CIS would move to 
the "second stage" of military development. In the next stage, member states will 
be required to designate certain military units to perform CIS peacekeeping duty -
- thereby creating a CIS common peacekeeping force. Responding to primarily 
Georgian and Moldovan calls for the establishment of non-Russian-led, NATO-
like peacekeeping units, Prudnikov shot back, "If a desire is expressed to recruit 
outside peacekeepers, that is absolutely wrong." (Nezavisimoye voyennoye 
obozreniye, No. 5, 6-12 Feb 98; FBIS-UMA-98-043) 
 
Comment 
The Russian-Belarusian mutual defense agreement goes way beyond even the 
1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. Sergeev's comments point to the 
obvious -- Russia's long-term strategic goal is to reintegrate all military 
organizations in the former Soviet space under Moscow's control. As we have 
pointed out in the past, the preferred method is by formalizing a CIS air defense 
 14 
system, CIS border troops, and CIS peacekeeping units. These types of 
formations seem innocuous enough. On the surface they appear to be strictly for 
defense and peace making. However, they enable Moscow to execute troop 
movements into other countries, as well as to maintain control of CIS wide 
command and control systems, communications, intelligence gathering, ground 
transportation links, and air traffic. 
 
Foreign ministry stays on message, sort of 
Boris Pastukhov, Russia's first deputy minister of foreign affairs, echoed the 
official foreign policy statements of President Yel'tsin and Victor Chernomyrdin 
when, in an interview with Rossiyskiye vesti, he noted that for the foreign 
ministry, 1998 is "The Year of the CIS." But he slipped up, referring to the 
sovereign countries around Russia's border as the "near abroad" -- a term 
Yel'tsin and Russia's CIS cooperation minister, Anatoli Adamishin, dislike. He did 
put a spin on the phrase, though. Pastukhov said he uses the term "near abroad" 
because neighboring countries and their people, are "near to our heart." 
(Rossiyskiye vesti, 10 Feb 98, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-98-051) 
 
In another example of spin control, the Russian foreign ministry now sees the 
creation of the CIS in 1991 as "an instrument ... conceived for a 'civilized divorce' 
of the former Union republics." Today, however, it serves as a "certain creative 
force." 
 
Pastukhov also discussed the armed conflicts occurring within the CIS and, like 
his friends in the defense ministry, quickly pointed out that "Russia alone carries 
the burden of their settlement," since Russia's "leading role in peacemaking in 
post-Soviet space is acknowledged by the international community." Maybe he 
doesn't consider the UN, EU, OSCE and many other organizations as part of the 
international community. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tracy Gerstle 
 
UKRAINE 
Luzhkov: Sevastopol has not been abandoned 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov reasserted that the city of Sevastopol must be 
returned to Russia, citing it as the "front post" of Russia's southern border. 
(Interfax 1217 GMT, 21 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-052) This was in the wake of his 
visit to the city on 21 February to present Black Sea sailors with keys to two new 
apartment blocks (financed from Moscow's coffers) which he promised would not 
be the last built there. He stressed that he was only a representative of 
Muscovites, the majority of whom "believe Sevastopol was (illegally) torn from 
Russia." Luzhkov also protested what he saw as the forced Ukrainization of 
Crimea's Russian population, via Ukrainian schools, newspapers and street 
signs. (Obshchaya gazeta, No. 7, 19-25 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-051) Mr. Luzhkov 
is considered by many to be one of the front-runners in Russia's presidential 
elections in 2000. He prides himself on his "patriotic, pro-Russian" platform. A 
UN report refutes his accusations, since currently there only two Ukrainian-
language schools in the Crimea, compared to 586 Russian-language schools 
and fifteen Tatar-Crimean schools. (Jamestown Monitor, 24 Feb 98) 
Crimea's and Sevastopol's status as part of Ukraine's territory has yet to be 
recognized by the Russian Duma, which has yet to ratify the Russian-Ukrainian 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership Treaty that would demarcate borders. 
 
Currently over 85,000 Russian sailors live in Crimea. When Ukraine became 
independent in 1991, their citizenship status was in limbo. Under the terms of the 
Black Sea Fleet arrangement last year, they were supposed to be permitted to 
choose either Russian or Ukrainian citizenship. It has now been over six months 
and the issue has still not been resolved, since the Russian government has yet 
to issue those soldiers who have chosen Russian citizenship the appropriate 
documents. These soldiers are routinely stopped when they cross the Russian 
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border. (Flag rodiny, 25 Dec 97, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-98-050) Separatists in the 
Crimea are hinting that it might be advantageous to offer Russian soldiers 
Ukrainian citizenship, permitting them to vote in any referenda on Crimea's 
status. (Zerkalo Nadeli, 22 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-057) 
 
Crimean parliament agrees to 29 March elections 
After many denunciations of President Leonid Kuchma's decree on holding early 
elections, and the violent tensions that gripped Yalta, members the Crimean 
parliament passed a resolution on 12 February to hold early elections to the 
Supreme Council on 29 March, one month before their terms were to end. The 
parliament finally gave in following threats by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to 
dissolve the organization if members did not concede. (Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 Feb 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-057) As a final protest, the Crimean lawmakers filed a motion 
with the Ukrainian Constitutional Court and sent a second letter to the Council of 
Europe secretary general. 
 
Comment 
The jury is out as to the legality of Kuchma's decree to hold early elections. It will 
be interesting to see if Constitutional Court will hear the case, though it seems 
unlikely. On 22 February, the Ukrainian justice ministry issued a statement that it 
was the Crimean parliamentarians, not President Kuchma, who acted "in breach 
of the Ukrainian Constitution and law." (Ukrayinske Radio, 0500 GMT, 22 Feb 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-053) The question now remains as to whether in such a short 
period of time Crimea will indeed be ready to hold democratic and fair elections. 
Many parliamentarians complained that the early date would not allow them to 
form parties, develop platforms, or support candidates. 
 
In the days following the storming of the Yalta City Council building, quiet seems 
to have settled over the Crimea. This may be due to Ukrainian interior ministry 
officials who have stationed over 6,500 police on the peninsula. Since the 
beginning of February, interior ministry officials reportedly have detained over 
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677 people suspected of various crimes, as well as initiating investigations of 
over 7,000 entities, 50 percent of which are private companies. Further 
investigation will try to determine whether the rate of detentions is due to a rise in 
crime or governmental harassment. (Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
057) 
 
Ukraine and Russia sign ten-year economic cooperation accord 
On 27 February, at the Kremlin, Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Russian Boris 
Yel'tsin signed an agreement on economic cooperation aimed at "doubling trade 
turnover between the two countries, which in 1997 totaled $14 billion."(RFE/RL 
Report, 27 Feb 98) The agreement was an indicator of better relations between 
the two, which President Kuchma rated at a "B+" level, compared to a grade of 
"C-" in the past. However, he said that the two countries still face many 
problems, such as recognizing one another's borders as detailed in the Russo-
Ukrainian friendship treaty. 
 
Mr. Kuchma also expressed reservations about the CIS, saying that "big 
quantities of paper are wasted to little effect.... Ukraine prefers bilateral 
ties,...(since they) produce practical fruit." He said that Ukraine supported 
"preserving" the CIS, but that it was not in favor of "groups of two and four" 
progressing at different speeds. He said efforts would be better spent forming a 
free-trade zone. (Interfax, 1745 GMT, 24 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-055) 
 
BELARUS 
Belarusian authorities deny signing weapons deal with Iran 
The Washington Post reported on 17 February that, during a trip scheduled by 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to Iran on 7 March to inaugurate the opening 
of a Belarusian embassy, he would sign a deal to send tank engines and other 
spare parts to the country. The Post's article followed a meeting by the Iranian-
Belarusian Economic Commission at the beginning of February, at which 
increasing trade between the two countries reportedly was discussed. This was 
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subsequently refuted by Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Nina Mazay at a 19 
February press conference: "We are not preparing such an agreement and this 
matter was not discussed." The Post reported that the spare parts would be used 
to maintain Iran's battalions of Soviet-made tanks. In response, Mikhail Kazlow, 
chief of the main headquarters of the Belarus Armed Forces, stated that currently 
Belarus does not even have the level of equipment "stipulated by the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty"; therefore, Belarus had nothing to 
sell. (Belapan, 1633 GMT, 21 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-052) The article also 
suggested that the Belarusians were acting as a front for what was indeed a deal 
between Russia and Iran. (The Washington Post, 17 Feb 98) 
 
In related news, a former KGB colonel, Leanid Rachkov, had been appointed as 
the new Belarusian Ambassador to Iran. Mr. Rachkov said he looked forward to 
working in Iran, since "many of our positions are close in both foreign and trade-
economic issues." (Svaboda, 4 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-044) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Gagauz-Yeri region to hold referendum on new constitution 
Deputies in the Gagauz autonomous region of Moldova voted on 16 February to 
organize a referendum on the question, simultaneously with the Moldovan 
parliamentary elections on 22 March, whether to adopt a constitution for Gagauz-
Yeri. 
 
Regional leader Georgi Tabunshchik and Dimitru Motopan, Moldovan 
parliamentary chairman, had asked the Gagauz parliament to consider 
postponing the referendum, since it may "affect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Moldova." (Basapress, 1855 GMT, 17 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-050) 
Piotr Pashaly, chair of the Gagauz assembly, has sent a draft of the constitution 
to the Council of Europe for its opinion of the document and its potential 
ramifications. (RFE/RL Report, 17 Feb 1998) 
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Russian Duma heeds request of Tiraspol to delay ratifying Moldovan treaty 
Russian Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev announced on 19 February that the 
Duma had postponed ratification of the Russian-Moldovan interstate treaty until 
March. The Treaty on Principles for Interstate Relations was signed and ratified 
by Moldova in 1990. (ITAR-TASS, 1120 GMT, 19 Feb 98; FBIS-SOV-98-050) 
Tiraspol had asked the Duma not to ratify the treaty, but rather to negotiate a 
new one that recognizes the "new situation" which has since come to pass in the 
Dniestr region. (RFE/RL Report, 20 Feb 98) 
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